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                                                                ABSTRACT 
This study addresses the issue of antidumping investigations and their effect on trade of 
agricultural products. The question which this study addresses is whether antidumping is helping 
domestic industries or is simply diverting trade away from the named countries to the non- 
named countries (countries not mentioned in the antidumping petition).  
Antidumping has emerged as an important tool in the hands of importing countries over 
the last two decades The World Trade Organization (WTO) has defined dumping as a situation 
of international price discrimination. Dumping occurs when exporting countries are selling the 
product in the international market at a price lower than the prices in the domestic market. By the 
implementation of the Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (The 
Antidumping Agreement), dumping is considered as an introduction of any product in the 
commerce of another country at less than its normal value. According to that article, WTO 
members can impose antidumping measures if after investigation, the following facts are proved: 
(i) that dumping is occurring, (ii) that the domestic industry producing the same product in the 
importing country is affected by material injury, and (iii) that there is causal link between the 
two. In 2001, at Doha, Qatar the WTO initiated a new round of global trade talks and an agenda 
was been signed declaring the new trade-remedy laws. The trade-remedy laws, though being in 
compliance with the WTO, have been viewed by the developing nations as a form of hidden 
protection for the developed world.  
 This study focuses on the U.S. antidumping investigation cases of agricultural products. 
which were filed during the time period 1994-2004 is considered. The study results suggest that 
there is no significant trade diversion from the named countries to the non-named countries but 







Antidumping has emerged as an important tool in the hands of importing countries over 
the last two decades and has been utilized as an instrument of trade policy by both the developed 
and the developing nations. In general terms, dumping is said to occur when an exporting 
country sells its product in the international market at a price lower than the price of that good in 
the domestic market.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) has defined dumping as a situation 
of international price discrimination.  
The implementation of the Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 19941 (The Antidumping Agreement), considered dumping as an introduction of any 
product in the business of another country at less than its normal value. According to that article, 
WTO members can impose antidumping measures if, after investigation, the following 
conditions are found.; (i) that dumping is occurring,  (ii) that the importing country’s (domestic) 
industry producing a ‘like’ product is being materially injured, and (iii) that there is causal link 
between the two.  
In 2001, at Doha, Qatar the WTO initiated a new round of global trade talks. An agenda 
was signed which, among other issues, declares the new trade remedy laws. The trade remedy 
laws, though in compliance with the WTO, have been viewed by the developing nations as a 
form of hidden protection for the developed world.2  There is also the perception among 
developing countries that these laws have been amended over time to make it easier for the 
domestic industries in the developed countries to receive protection.  
                                                 
1 www.wto.org 
 
2 Historically, trade was restricted via the implementation of high duty rates.  Such a procedure was highly 
transparent.  
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Economists have also argued that policy makers protect their domestic industries under 
the guise of antidumping law. Specifically some economists have argued that “antidumping” or 
“countervailing” measures are used simply as an alternative to traditional import barriers (i.e., 
tariffs). During the period of 1995 to 2004, WTO members initiated a total of 2,626 cases in 
total,   out of which 1656 cases resulted in an affirmative outcome favoring the restrictions3  
Antidumping cases filed in the U.S. during the 1994-2005 period is illustrated in Figure 1.1 
(source: http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/.) During this period, a total of 426 AD 
cases were filed, out of which 293 cases resulted in affirmative decision.   
 





















Figure1.1 Yearly Filings of US AD cases, 1994-2005.   
As suggested by the information in the Figure 1.1, peak yearly filings, which exceeded 
70, occurred in 2001 and the number has fallen sharply since that year.  The U.S. entered a 
recession in March 2001, and, as noted by Feinberg (2004), industry has become adept in the 
timing of petitions. 4  By filing when there is a ‘downturn’ in the economy, specifically, the 
                                                 
3 Ganguli. B. (2005), “The Trade Effects of Indian Antidumping Actions”, The State University of New Jersey, 
Rutgers 
4 Feinberg, R. M.  2004.  “U.S. antidumping enforcement and macroeconomic indicators: What do petitioners 
expect, and are they correct?”  Unpublished manuscript (American University). 
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ability to show ‘material harm’ is enhanced.  The abnormally large number of petitions filed in 
2001 likely is the result of the recession and the decline thereafter, at least in part, likely reflects 
a strengthening of the U.S. economy.   
1.1 Goals and Objectives 
The overall goal of this study is to examine whether antidumping duties on agricultural 
products (a) limit imports from targeted countries, and (b) result in trade diversion among non-
named countries. To accomplish this goal, alternative econometric models that have been 
proposed by previous researchers are first considered in Chapter II.   
This chapter provides the background information of the procedure of antidumping 
investigation and also a brief discussion of the conceptual models that are additionally 
considered for this study.  In Chapter III, the models outlined in Chapter II are tested and the 
results are explained accordingly.   Conclusions and issues for further research are presented in 
the chapter IV, the last chapter. 
1.2 Background   Information on U.S. Antidumping Mechanisms5 
The overall investigation process for antidumping and countervailing duty cases are 
divided into five stages.6 Each of these stages end with a determination either by the United 
States Department of Commerce (USDOC) or by the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC):  (i) initiation of the investigation by USDOC, (ii) the preliminary phase 
of the USITC investigation, (iii) the preliminary phase of the USDOC investigation, (iv) the final 
phase of the USDOC investigation, and (v) the final phase of the USITC investigation. There is a 
partial overlap in some of these stages with the exception of Commerce’s preliminary 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 A flowchart of  the U.S. antidumping mechanism is presented in Figure 1.2 
6 This section relates only to the U.S. investigation phase.  The specifics of an investigation will vary from one 
country to another. 
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determination (stage 3).  A negative determination by either Commerce or the Commission 
results in a termination of proceedings at both agencies.7 
The statutory deadlines relating to the five stages are as follows:  (i) initiation (20 days 
after the filing of the petition), (ii)  preliminary determination by the USITC (45 days after the 
filing of the petition),  (iii) preliminary determination by the USDOC (115 days after the 
Commission’s preliminary determination in antidumping cases or 40 days in countervailing duty 
cases),  (iv) final determination by the USDOC (75 days after Commerce’s preliminary 
determination),  and (v) final determination by the USITC (120 days after Commerce’s 
preliminary determination or 45 days after its final determination,  whichever is later) 
An interested party is required to file an antidumping or countervailing duty petition 
simultaneously (i.e., on the same day) with both the USDOC and the USITC. The USDOC 
determines whether the petition alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of a duty and 
contains information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations within 20 
days after the date on which the petition is filed. If the determination is affirmative, the USDOC 
initiates an investigation to determine whether dumping exist the investigation finds no proof, 
then a negative determination is declared by the USITC at which point the petition is dismissed 
resulting in the termination of the proceedings. 
1.2.1 Preliminary Phase of the USITC Investigation 
The USITC makes a determination within 45 days after the date on which the petition is 
filed.  This determination, based upon the best information available to it at the time, considers 
whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured 
or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is 
                                                 
7 United States International Trade Commission(2007), “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook”, 12th 
Edition pp 13-130 
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materially retarded, by reason of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the 
investigation.  The preliminary phase of the Commission’s investigation can be broken down 
into six stages: (i) initiation of the investigation and scheduling of the preliminary phase, (ii) 
questionnaires, (iii) staff conference and briefs, (iv) staff report and memoranda, (v) briefing and 
vote, and (vi) determination and views of the Commission.8 
1.3 Institution of the Investigation and Scheduling of the Preliminary Phase 
When a properly filed petition is received by the USITC, a six-person team consisting of 
an investigator, an economist, an accountant/auditor, an industry analyst, an attorney, and a 
supervisory investigator is assigned to the investigation.  The staff develops a work schedule for 
conducting the preliminary phase of the investigation and prepares a notice of intention of 
investigation for publication in the Federal Register.   The purpose of the notice is to provide 
information to the public concerning the subject matter of the investigation and the schedule to 
be followed.   
Any person other than the petitioner who wishes to appear before the Commission as a 
party in the investigation must file an “entry of appearance” with the Secretary of the 
Commission9. A person who is found by the Secretary to have a proper reason for participating 
in the investigation will be permitted to appear in the investigation as a party; acceptance of that 
person’s entry of appearance is signified by the Secretary’s inclusion of the person on a 
document referred to as the public service list.  Entries of appearance submitted during the 
                                                 
8 United States International Trade Commission(2007), “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook”, 12th 
Edition pp 13-130 
 
9 An entry of appearance is a letter or document that states briefly the nature of the person’s reason for participating 
in the investigation and the person’s intent to file briefs with the Commission regarding the subject matter of the 
investigation (United States International Trade Commission(2007), “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Handbook”, 12th Edition pp 13-130) 
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preliminary phase of the investigation must be filed with the Secretary not later than seven days 
after publication of the Commission’s notice of initiation in the Federal Register. 
1.3.1 Questionnaires 
Once the petition is reviewed, the staff drafts questionnaires to solicit relevant 
information from U.S. producers, U.S. importers, and foreign producers.  The requested 
information is a function of that needed by the USITC in order to make its determination.  
Questionnaires are sent to all U.S. producers except in cases involving an unusually large 
number of firms (in such cases, they may be sent to the largest producers in the industry or to a 
representative sample of firms).  Similarly, questionnaires generally are mailed to all importers 
of the product in question, particularly those importing from the country (countries) subject to 
investigation.  If the number of importers is unusually large, questionnaires may be sent only to 
the largest importers or to a representative sample.  Foreign producer questionnaires are sent 
only to producers from the subject countries.  Foreign producer questionnaires typically are sent 
to the firms through counsel as soon as counsels are identified to staff or, if the firms are not 
represented, the questionnaires are mailed directly.  U.S. producers and importers are required to 
respond to questionnaires; failure to reply as directed can result in a subpoena or other order to 
compel a response.   Foreign producers are not required to respond to questionnaires.  Failure to 
respond, however, may result in an adverse inference by the Commission. 
In drafting questionnaires, the key issue that must be resolved is the identification of the 
product or products with respect to which data will be collected.  In making its determination, the 
USITC must assess injury to a U.S. “industry” producing a product that is “like” the imported 
product subject to investigation.  The statute defines “industry” as the producers as a whole of a 
domestic like product, or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like product 
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constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of the product. The law defines 
“domestic like product” as a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in 
characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an investigation10. 
1.3.2 Different Parts of the Questionnaires 
Producer questionnaires generally consist of four parts.  The first part asks a number of 
general questions relating to the organization and activities of the firm and the reason for its 
supporting or opposing the petition.  The second part requests data on capacity, production, 
inventories, commercial shipments, export shipments, internal consumption, company transfers, 
employment, hours worked, wages paid, and purchases.  Part three of the questionnaire involves 
financial data, including income-and-loss data on the product in question; data on capital 
expenditures, research and development expenses, and asset valuation; and questions regarding 
the impact of imports on capital and investment.  The fourth and final part of the producer 
questionnaire requests sales prices and other price-related information and solicits allegations of 
lost revenues and lost sales attributable to the subject imports (petitioners are required to provide 
this information in the petition rather than the questionnaire). 
Importer questionnaires generally consist of three parts. The first part relates to the 
organization and activities of the firm.  The second part requests data on imports of the product 
in question; the quantity and value of commercial shipments, export shipments, internal 
consumption, and company transfers of such imports; and inventories of imports.  The third part 
of the importer questionnaire solicits data on sales prices for subject imported merchandise and 
other price-related information similar to that requested in the producer questionnaire. 
                                                 
10 United States International Trade Commission(2007), “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook”, 12th 
Edition pp 13-130 
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Foreign producer questionnaires are composed of three parts.  The first two parts consist 
of general questions about the firm’s operations in the country in question and in the United 
States.  The third part requests data on the firm’s capacity, production, home-market shipments, 
exports to the United States and other markets, and inventories of the subject merchandise. 
1.4 Summary of Antidumping Law:  
In a nutshell, U.S antidumping cases can be summarized in to several steps from the 
initiation period to the final phase of determination and assessment duties.11 After filing of the 
antidumping petition, the International Trade Administration12 (ITA) has 20 days to determine 
the validity of the petition. Once the validity is determined the investigation phase is initiated. If 
the determination is affirmative then a course of action is taken unless the petitioner terminates 
or suspends the case.13  If the preliminary determination by the USITC is negative then the 
investigation is terminated (though there may still be negotiations among countries).14 
The ITA determines the final “less than fair value” (LTFV) in situations where the cases 
are neither terminated nor suspended. Within 75 days of the preliminary determination, the ITA 
makes this final determination. When both the preliminary and final determination of ITA is 
affirmative, then the USITC must make its final determination of injury within 120 days of 
preliminary determination or 45 days of final determination. If the final determination by the 
USITC is also affirmative, the ITA has 7 days to implement the antidumping duties. When final 
determination of injury is affirmative, dumping margins are calculated for assessing the duties. 
                                                 
11 Staiger, R. W., Wolak, F. A., Litan E. Robert, Katz, L. Michael and Leonard (1994),“Measuring  industry specific 
protection: antidumping in the United States.” Brookings Paper on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1: 51-118 
 
12 The ITA is a unit within the USDOC. 
13 At any point of time after the preliminary determination by the ITA and before the final determination by the 
USITC, the investigation may be terminated or suspended at the request of petitioners.  Termination is generally the 
result of some price agreement between the exporter named in the petition and the domestic industry. 
14 Prusa, Thomas J.(1992), “Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?,” Journal of International 
Economics, 33(1/2) 
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The calculations of the antidumping duties are based on the prices of the imports. The final 
duties are assessed only if the preliminary LTFV determination is affirmative. Once the final 
determination is affirmative, antidumping duties apply to three possible ranges of imports. In 
case of negative preliminary LTFV determination, duties equal to the actual dumping margins 
will be imposed on the relevant imports entering the United States after the date of final 
determination. If, alternatively, the preliminary investigation is affirmative then duties are 
imposed after the preliminary investigation or in critical circumstances ninety days before the 







Final ruling by USITC: 120 days after USDOC’s preliminary ruling 
Final determination by USDOC: 75 days after the USDOC’s preliminary  determination 
Preliminary phase of Investigation by the USDOC: 115 days after the Commission’s 
preliminary determination 
Preliminary phase of Investigation by the United States Trade Commission (USITC): 45 days 
after the filing of petition 
Initiation of the investigation by United States Department of Commerce (USDOC): 20 days 
after the filing of petition 





1. 5 Antidumping Cases filed during 1990-2006 
Table 1.1 provides a detailed summary of the US antidumping cases filed during the 
period 1990-2006. The first column in the table reports the year of filing and the case number for 
each category.15 The second column in the table has the product against which antidumping 
investigation has been filed. The next two column reports the final disposition and the total 
number of antidumping cases filed in the year corresponding to the first column. From this table 
it is found that almost in every year an antidumping investigation case was filed against 
agricultural products. In the year 2001, there were a total of 92 petitions filed of which 7 
involved agricultural products.  In 2004, there were 8 petitions filed against agricultural products 
out of a total of 34 petitions. In 2006 there are 2 petitions involved agricultural products, or one-
quarter of the total number of petitions filed16.  
The countries which were subject to antidumping investigations of the agricultural 
sectors during this the period 1990-2006 is given in Table 1.2. As indicated, Canada is the most 
frequently targeted country (seven petitions), closely followed by China (six petitions).  Such a 
finding is to be expected given that both of these countries are large trading partners with the 
United States.  Petitions against countries that export only a limited amount of products to the 
United States (or whose exports of any given product to the U.S. tend to be limited), such as 
Turkey, are infrequently targeted by U.S. industries for antidumping duties.   
 
                 
                                                 
15 The case number is assigned to each of the product and country. In other words each product and each country is 
categorized to a single case.  
16 The analysis is table 1.1 is based  on different data base than the data base used  for figure 1.1. In figure 1.1 the 
cases are all combined together. 
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Source: Import Injury Investigations Case Statistics (FY 1980-2005): USITC office of investigations, Jan 2008 
Fiscal 
Year/Case No 
Product  Country Final 
Disposition 
2006/1105 Lemon Juice Argentina N/A 8 
2006/1106 Lemon Juice Mexico N/A  
2005/1089 Certain Orange Juice Brazil Affirmative 10 
2004/1057 Processed Hazelnuts Turkey Terminated 34 
2004/1062 Kosher Chicken Canada Negative  
2004/1063 Frozen or canned warm water shrimp Brazil Affirmative  
2004/1064 Frozen or canned warm water shrimp China Affirmative  
2004/1065 Frozen or canned warm water shrimp Ecuador Affirmative  
2004/1066 Frozen or canned warm water shrimp India Affirmative  
2004/1067 Frozen or canned warm water shrimp Thailand Affirmative  
2004/1068 Frozen or canned warm water shrimp Vietnam Affirmative  
2004/1076 Live Swine Canada Negative  
2002/1012 Frozen Fish Fillet Vietnam Affirmative 35 
2002/1019 Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat  Canada Affirmative  
2001/923 Oleoresin paprika India Negative 92 
2001/924 Mussels Canada Terminated  
2001/925 Green House Tomatoes Canada Negative  
2001/926 Spring Table Grapes Chile Negative  
2001/927 Spring table Grapes Mexico Negative  
2001/928 Softwood Lumber Canada Affirmative  
2001/948 Red Raspberries Chile Affirmative  
2000/892 Honey Argentina Affirmative 35 
2000/893 Honey China Affirmative  
1999/812 Live Cattle Canada Negative 50 
1999/813 Live Cattle Mexico Negative  
1998/776 Certain preserved mushrooms Chile Affirmative 33 
1998/777 Certain preserved mushrooms China Affirmative  
1998/778 Certain preserved mushrooms India Affirmative  
1998/779 Certain preserved mushrooms Indonesia Affirmative  
1998/780 Butter Cookies Denmark Affirmative  
1997/768 Fresh Atlantic Salmon Chile Affirmative 23 
1996/ 747 Fresh Tomatoes Mexico Suspended 13 
1996/ 752 Craw Fish Tail Meat China Affirmative  
1995/722 Honey China Suspended 18 
1995/734 Pasta Italy Affirmative  
1995/735 Pasta Turkey Affirmative  
1994/683 Fresh Garlic China Affirmative 59 
1994/706 Canned Pineapple Thailand Affirmative  
1991/516 Kiwi Fruit New Zealand Affirmative 65 
1990/454 Atlantic Salmon Norway Affirmative 21 
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Table 1.2: Countries Most Frequently Named in Antidumping Investigations of Agricultural            
Products: 1990-2004 














Source: Import Injury Investigations Case Statistics (FY 1980-2005): USITC office of investigations, Jan 2008 
 
1.6   Antidumping Literature 
 
While a large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has attempted to explain 
and show the strategic and incentive effects of antidumping (henceforth AD) duties, few studies 
have focused specifically on the issue of trade diversion and AD duties.  An earlier research 
effort by Baldwin (1985) primarily focused on the determinants of administrative protection 
associated with AD17. More recently, much of the research effort associated with analysis of AD 
has attempted to determine the effects of the initial investigation and subsequent AD (if any) on 
imports by domestic countries.18 In these more recent efforts, researchers emphasize the 
construction of empirical models which provide quantitative estimates of AD related effects.  
                                                 
17 Baldwin, Robert E.(1985), “ The Political economy of U.S import policy”, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press 
18  Thomas J. Prusa  ( 1997)in Feenstra edited book, “ The Effects of U.S Trade Protection and Promotion Policies” 
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Both the earlier and more recent research efforts highlight the effects of AD measures; 
though from two different perspectives.19  One of the perspectives relates to addressing AD 
measures at micro level.  The other perspective addresses AD measures from the macro 
perspective. For example, Krupp and Pollard (1992) explored the issue of import diversion by 
looking into the trade pattern of single industry but were unable to address the general issue of 
trade diversion from a wider perspective.20 Staiger and Wolak (1994), however, estimated the 
trade effects of antidumping investigation with a particular emphasis on investigation or filing 
effects on the countries against which antidumping petition has been filed. They found some 
evidence of import diversion. Analysis by Prusa (1997) represents the first attempt to incorporate 
the issue of trade diversion into the research arena of antidumping trade investigation cases at the 
macro level. In this seminal research effort, Prusa used time series data for the period of 1978-
1993 to examine the impact of an antidumping (AD) investigation on trade. The lined item21 
tariff codes for each of the antidumping petitions filed between the years 1980-1988 were used in 
the analysis of both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.22 His analysis found trade 
diversion; i.e., that trade is diverted from the countries named in the petition to the countries not 
named in the petition.23  If accurate, this would suggest that U.S. antidumping laws have the 
peculiar side effect of benefiting countries and firms that were not named in the investigation  
                                                 
19 Shortcomings associated with these efforts, however, are found with respect to data aggregation used in empirical 
analyses.  Specifically, even though AD measures are officially taken at highly disaggregated levels of traded 
products (10 digit classifications), extant research has primarily been based on some form of aggregated data (e.g., 8 
digit classifications) rather than the disaggregated classification associated with the petition and subsequent duties. 
20 Thomas J. Prusa  ( 1997)in Feenstra edited book, “ The Effects of U.S Trade Protection and Promotion Policies” 
21 The lined item is generally defined as the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) items. The codes according to the 
HTS classification were obtained  in either a 10-digit level,8-digit level or at 4 digit level.    
22 Prusa (1997) in his study has used both the manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector data to 
examine the overall impact of antidumping investigation in trade. 
23 In other words, though imports from the named countries are restricted by means of the antidumping duty, imports 
from other countries are not restricted and increase to partially or totally mitigate the reduction in imports among 
named countries. 
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Konnings et al. (2001) examined the effects of European antidumping measures on 
import flows. The empirical analysis estimated the effects of European antidumping cases on 
import diversion from the subject country (the country named in the petition) to the non-subject 
country (the country not named in the petition).  The results suggest that, in contrast to the 
United States, trade diversion is limited in the European economy. Hence, if accurate, the results 
by Konnings et al. (2001) would imply that the European antidumping mechanisms are effective 
in limiting imports; hence, likely benefiting domestic producers of like product.24 
 In contrast to the analysis by Konnings et al. (2001), Ganguli (2005) examined the trade 
effects of Indian antidumping actions and found that antidumping actions (i.e., the imposition of 
duties) result in trade diversion in the Indian economy. These findings would suggest that Indian 
antidumping mechanisms work in a similar manner to those in the U.S. (based upon Prusa 2001)) 
but unlike those in Europe (based on analysis by Konnings et al. (2001).  
Niels ( 2003), found that  antidumping  measures  in Mexico  exhibited a  significant  
trade  destruction effect on  the named countries—both  in terms of import volume and  import 
value. The effect is particularly strong for cases against non-US imports (including developing 
countries and the processed food, textile and rubber industries). Though this study does not find 
evidence of trade diversion (i.e., imports from the non-named countries have no statistical 
relationship with the imposition of antidumping measures) there is some evidence of reputation 
effect (this effect mainly measures the reputation of a country when an antidumping duty is 
imposed) on antidumping in Mexico.25 
                                                 
24 Konings, Vandenbussche  and Springael (2001), “Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy”, Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade 1(3): 283-299 
 
25 Niels Gunnar ( 2003), “ Trade Diversion and Destruction Effects of Antidumping Policy: Empirical Evidence 
from Mexico, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
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In a 2001 study, Prusa (2001) documented two of the key costs of antidumping. First, 
once a country adopts the ideology of imposition of antidumping duty, it becomes difficult for 
the country to restrain its use. Second, the filing of a petition reduces trade among those 
countries named in the petition.  This occurs regardless of whether the findings are affirmative or 
negative or rejected.26 This implies the presence of investigation or “harassment effect” of the 
antidumping cases. In other words even if the final disposition for antidumping investigation is 
negative, trade from that country declines as result of the investigation.  
The majority of research efforts in the area of antidumping have attempted to measure the 
effectiveness of antidumping legislation by aggregating over all commodities (manufacturing 
and agricultural). The seminal work on the effect of antidumping duties in the agricultural sector 
starts with Malhotra and Kassam (2006). Their study includes the agricultural AD investigation 
petitions filed with USITC during the period 1990-2002. They constructed an econometric model 
creating affirmative and negative dummy variables to explore the issue of trade diversion 
resulting from U.S. antidumping investigations of agricultural products. Shortly thereafter, 
Malhotra et al. (2008) expanded their earlier analysis and concluded that AD is an effective tool 
in restricting trade of agricultural products to the U.S. market. Their results, based on imports 
from both named and non-named countries imports, indicated that, unlike the manufacturing 
sector in the US, trade diversion towards countries not named in the petition is limited in the 
agricultural sector27. Antidumping duties, however, were successful in restricting imports for 
agricultural products from the named countries.  
                                                 
26 Prusa Thomas. J., (2001), “On the spread and impact of Antidumping”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(3): 
591-611 
27 Malhotra, Rus and Kassam (2008), “ Antidumping  Duties in Agricultural Sector: Trade Restricting or Trade 
Deflecting?”, Global Economy Journal, Vol 8(2) 
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Carter and Gunning (2008) also attempted to examine the degree to which U.S. 
agricultural imports targeted in AD and CVD cases are affected by an import duty.  Their 
analysis also considers how imports from third countries, not named in the AD/CVD case, react 
to the imposition of an import duty levied on their competitors In addition, they looked into the 
investigation effect of antidumping investigation The data set used in this study is on the 
agricultural antidumping cases filed between the time period 1980-2005.  Their results suggest 
that: (a) duties result in a negative trade diversion of agricultural products among the targeted 
countries, and (b) that the imposition of AD/CVD duties does not result in trade diversion among 
countries not named in the petition. 28 
                                                 
28 In an alternative framework, researchers have claimed that foreign firms exercise market power. In most analyses, 
however, the empirical models have been based on the concept that the product market exhibits perfect competition. 
To introduce imperfect competition, Bown and Crowley (2007) assumed oligopolistic market power in a game 
theoretic perspective to demonstrate the effect of an AD duty on world trade flows.  Bown and Crowley’s three 
country model was used to illustrate that the imposition of an import duty by a country alters the trade pattern 
between the three countries. The theoretical model developed by the authors predicts an exporting firm’s reaction to 




LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The concept of trade diversion has been widely used to examine the effectiveness of 
antidumping investigation cases. Importing countries, in general, claim that foreign firms (or a 
single firm) are dumping their product in the domestic market in an attempt to capture a larger 
market share. Following this argument, an antidumping petition is filed against the exporting 
country. In the process, the domestic industry must provide evidence of material injury to the 
USITC. If dumping is found to be occurring and if the USITC determines that dumping is 
resulting in material injury to the domestic industry, then an antidumping duty is imposed on the 
foreign firm(s).  
2.1 Theoretical Model of Trade Diversion: 
In the international trade literature, trade diversion reflects a situation where trade is 
diverted from a more efficient exporter towards a less efficient one due to a free trade agreement. 
In general, when an economy engages in trade it will try to import from the nation which is most 
efficient. Likewise, when a country imposes a tariff on imports from all nations, it will import 
the product from the country which is most efficient. But in the situation of a free trade 
agreement, if the agreement is signed with a less efficient producer, then there is the potential for 
trade to be diverted from a more efficient producer to a less efficient one. The concept of trade 
diversion is illustrated in Figure 2.1. For illustrative purposes, assume that there are three 
countries denoted as country A country B and country C and that trade between the countries is 
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical Background of Trade Diversion  
  The demand and supply schedules for country A are given by the lines D and S, 
respectively.  Free trade prices are given as P1 and P2 for country B and country C respectively. 
(Note: Country B is capable of supplying the product at a lower price than country C)29. Now 
assume that tariff is imposed on both country B and country C. As a result their respective prices 
will increase to P1t and P2t   . The size of the tariff is given by the dotted line. Since with the 
imposition of tariff results in the product price from country B being less than that for country C, 
country A will import from country B and will not trade initially with country C. Initial tariff 
revenue is given by the area (c+e).  
Now assume, that country A is entering a free trade agreement with country C so P2t=0   
but the prevailing tariff rate for country B remains at P1t. The domestic prices for country B and 
country C are given by P1t and P2.  Since P2 < P1t country A will import the entire product from 
country C and there will be no trade with country B. Though  the non-distorted (i.e., free trade) 
                                                 
29 In order for this to be possible country C must have tariffs or other trade restrictions on imports from country B, or 
else all of C's market would be supplied by B 
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price in country B is less than the price in country C , trade is said to be diverted from a more 
efficient supplier to a less efficient supplier. 
The theoretical background associated with international trade theory on trade diversion 
was discussed in the previous paragraph. The emphasis of this study relates to the issue of 
whether (a) antidumping duties influence the level of imports from named countries and (b) 
whether antidumping duties divert trade from countries named in the antidumping petition to 
countries not named in the petition. Hence we are focusing on the economic aspects of 
antidumping in the agricultural sector of the United States.  One of the reasons may be attributed 
to the difference in cost of production in the two countries. Due to this cost differential, the 
country with a lower cost of production will be able to produce the good more efficiently and, 
hence offer a low selling price in the market compared to countries with higher costs of 
production. Additionally, there could be the pricing strategy followed by the exporting countries 
in the two different markets. Specifically, it is possible that an exporting country is acting as a 
monopolist in the domestic economy whereas it is behaving as a perfectly competitor in the 
international market. If so, then under certain conditions, the exporting country could sell the 
same product in the domestic market at a higher price than it is selling the product for in the 
international market.  
2.2 Different Models and Estimation 
A number of models have been considered in an attempt to evaluate the effect of 
antidumping cases and/or subsequent duties on trade in countries named in the petition (i.e., 
named countries) as well as countries not named in the petition (i.e., non-named countries).  As 
would be expected, these models have gradually evolved over time.  The evolution in these 
models reflects a number of factors.  First, data sources have become “richer” which has allowed 
 19
for the development of more detailed models.  Second, some of the initial models can be 
considered as “crude” by today’s standards and the newer models naturally build upon the 
theoretical construct and findings associated with the earlier models.  Finally, questions being 
asked (i.e., hypothesis to be tested based on a given model specification) have expanded 
requiring alternative model specifications.  The purpose of this section is to review some of the 
major research efforts in the arena of trade diversion.  Since the empirical analysis conducted in 
this thesis relates to products produced by the agricultural sector, particular attention to studies 
that have considered trade diversion of agricultural products is given at the end of this section. 
2.2.1 Konnings VandenBussche & Springael Model (2001) 
The model considered by Konnings et al. (2001) analyzes the effects of antidumping 
investigations in the European Union.  The model, which builds upon the work conducted by 




















For this model,  ln imports jit represents the natural log of imports for case i( i=1….,246) at time 
t(t=0….,6) for country group j (named, non-named).  The variable ln imports jit0-1 is included in 
the model to control for initial import size effects and the evolution of imports prior to the 
antidumping investigation. Konnings et al. (2001) argue that this variable is relevant since the 
average total import value for named countries is smaller than the one for the non-named 
countries. The variable dutyit   is equal to 1 if there is a duty for the case i at time t.  Similarly, the 
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dummy variable Undertakingit is equal to 1, if there is a price undertaking for case i at time t.30   
The discrete variable termiit ( termination) takes on a value of 1 when there is termination for 
case i at time t. In addition the dummy variable Namedt is equal to 1 if the country is named in 
the investigation (i.e., subject to a duty if found to be dumping). This dummy is also used to 
interact with the policy variables to capture the effects of antidumping actions on the named 
countries. The variable numbert   represents the log number of countries that are named in the 
petition. The data used in the analysis by Konnings et al. (2001) in their analysis is based on the 
8-digit product based on Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) and the period of investigation 
transcends the years 1985 to 1990.  
 The findings reported by Konnings et al (2001) indicate that trade diversion as a result of 
antidumping investigations (and possible duties) in the European Union is lower than in the 
United States (as found by Prusa, 1997). Two of the most relevant reasons for this finding, as 
given by the authors, are as follows. First, one of the differences is between the European Union 
antidumping policy and that of the United States reflects the level of dumping protection. In the 
United States, the duty is based on the estimated dumping margin whereas it is based on injury 
margin in the European Union (provided it is of lesser value than the dumping margin). This 
being the case, Konnings et al. (2001) argues that the lower level of protection offered European 
Union countries in antidumping cases limits the potential benefits that would otherwise be 
forthcoming from trade diversion among non-named countries. 
A second argument proffered by Konnings et al. (2001) for the lower trade diversion in 
the European Union vis-à-vis the United States relates to “…the greater extent of uncertainty and 
                                                 
30 A price undertaking is a commitment by the foreign importer to eliminate injury by pulling up its price in the 
European market. This commitment is imposed and closely monitored by the Commission and in case of violation 
heavily penalized ( See Konnings et al. 2001) 
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information asymmetries surrounding the EU decision making process (p. 294).”  Specifically, 
the authors argue that antidumping duties in the United States are more of a “technical nature” 
and, hence, not subject to a great deal of political influence.  By comparison, antidumping 
decisions in the European Union are subject to a substantial political influence.   Lower 
transparency and predictability in the European Union vis-à-vis the United States, according to 
the authors, potentially results in more prudent reaction among non-named countries when 
considering whether to increase imports following the European Union imposition of 
antidumping duties.  
2.2.2Prusa Model (1997) 
The pioneering research of Prusa (1997) remains the most important and relevant 
research effort in the context of antidumping analysis. To analyze the effects of a duty on named 




















The variable ln xi,tj denotes the log of imports for case i at time t, where t0 corresponds to the year 
petition was filed, t1 to the period of investigation and t2…t5 are the years following the outcome. 
The variable LnDutyi denotes the size of the final duty (in log form).  The variable Numnamedi is 
discrete in nature and takes a value of 1 when the number of countries named in the petition is 
equal to or greater than three.  The variable Deci is a decision dummy, equal to 1, if duties are 
imposed. Calendar year dummies are included as yeart j to control for short-run effects arising in 
that year (and not specifically modeled in the equation) which might influence level of imports 
                                                 
31 The model was estimated using ordinary least squares. 
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(e.g., disruptions in supply from an exporting region). Finally, tj is a trend variable which is 
included in the analysis in an attempt to “capture” long-run, structural macroeconomic changes. 
 Based on this model, Prusa (1997) was able to examine trade diversion. Results indicated 
a significant amount of trade diversion from the named countries to the non-named countries. In 
a later study (Prusa, 2001), the author used a different model to analyze the effect of an 
antidumping investigation and found evidence of an “investigation effect.”  Specifically, he 
observed that even if the cases are rejected (i.e., no duties were imposed), imports from the 
named countries declined as a result of the investigation. 
2.2.3 Ganguli Model (2005) 
Analysis by Ganguli (2005) examined the trade effects of Indian antidumping actions. 





















The variable denotes value of imports at time period tk (k=0…9) for country group j 
(named, non-named).  The time subscript t0 refers to the period of initiation of the given case, t1 
denotes the period of investigation and t2 through t4 represent calendar year dummy variables 
subsequent to outcome of the investigation.
j
,tkix
32  . The first two explanatory variables represent the 
value of imports in the two immediate periods prior to the case being initiated.  These variables 
were included in the analysis to account for the size effect of earlier imports before the AD 
legislation sets in. The interaction term of dutyyi and time periods (in the form of FinalDutyi x tk ) 
                                                 




are introduced in the analysis to account for the “staggered effects” of the duty in the subsequent 
years following the time period of initiation. Finally the year term (yeartk) is included in the 
model in an attempt to “capture” any trend effect on imports due to changing macroeconomic 
conditions.  The analysis conducted by Ganguli (2005) indicated a significant amount of trade 
diversion in the Indian economy as a result of antidumping investigation.  
2.2.4 Carter & Gunning Model (2008) 
The model developed by Carter and Gunning (2008) analyzes the agricultural AD 
investigation cases during the period 1980-2004. In a departure from the estimation techniques 
used by earlier researchers, the model presented by the authors uses Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) estimation to allow for AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and 
heteroscedasticity across panels by utilizing a consistent estimator for the variance matrix. 
Unlike the standard random effect estimation, this methodology uses robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroscedasticity across panels and AR(1) autocorrelation structure to capture serial 
correlation within a specific time period for each case. When data sets exhibit a large number of 
panels relative to the lesser number of time periods within each panel, this methodology 
generally provides a better fit to the data.  The model considered by the authors is given as 
follows:   




























The variable ln(dutyi) denotes the weighted average final tariff33. The value of foreign 
agriculture, depicted as ln(foreignagitj), is introduced as a proxy for agriculture sector growth of 
the named country (operating as an export-supply shifter).  The variable ln(exchrateitj) refers the 
change in exchange rate between the named country currency and US dollar. The third control 
variable ln(domesticproditj) represents the quantity of U.S. agricultural production of commodity 
i (working as an import demand shifter). Another control variable, ln(importsit-1), denotes the 
value of U.S. imports of product i in period t-1.  The variable is introduced into the analysis in an 
attempt to “capture” the import size effect  and the effects of all other imports prior to the period 
of investigation. Two trend variables trenditj and yearitj   refers to the annualized index based on a 
month a case is initiated and to the actual years surrounding each case.  
 2.2.5 Malhotra, Rus and Kassam Model (2008) 
Like that of Carter and Gunning (2008), the analysis by Malhotra et al. (2008) focuses on 
the effects of the antidumping investigations specific to the agricultural sector. Three separate set 
of equations were considered (OLS, fixed effect estimator and GMM estimator) to analyze the 
effect of antidumping investigations associated with agricultural products. Furthermore, separate 
analyses were conducted for the named country imports and the non-named country imports. The 












The dependent variable (ln importsjit) denotes imports of product i in tth   year for subject and 
non-subject countries. The explanatory variables affirmativet and negativet are decision dummies 
                                                 
33 While the authors refer to a weighted average final duty in this paper, it is unclear how weights were assigned to 
each company since quantity data are not provided in the Federal Register 
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for affirmative and negative cases. The variable affirmative takes the value of 1 for a case if the 
decision was affirmative and if duties were subsequently imposed and the variable negative takes 
the value 1 if the decision was negative and no duties were imposed.   The authors interacted 
‘affirmative’ and 'negative' dummies with the 'year' dummy in order to capture the time trend of 
imports for affirmative and negative cases. This has been done both for named and non-named 
countries.  In estimating the above equation, the authors control for macroeconomic influences, 
such as exchange rate changes and business cycles, by including calendar year dummies.  In this 
paper, the researchers estimated the effect of antidumping duties on the named countries and the 
non-named countries.34  
2.3 Econometric Issues 
 
 The empirical models considered in the previous sections are largely based on dynamic 
panel data. A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond 
is used in two of these studies (Ganguli, 2005 and Malhotra et al, 2008). This method is used to 
capture both the cross country aspects as well as the temporal aspects of changing patterns in 
import flows. The basic model used in these studies is: 
        itutixtiytiytiy ++−∂+−∂+= βα ,2,21,1, ----------------------------- (1) 
In this model   is used to measure the dollar value of imports and which depends on its own 
lag. and  are scalars,  is the 1 × K vector of explanatory variables and 
tiy ,
1∂ 2∂ tix , β  is  K× 1 
vector.  In this model it is assumed that the error term follows a one way error component model. 
      = itu ,itvi +μ                    ----------------------------------------- (2) 
                                                 
34 Malhotra, Rus and Kassam (2008), “Antidumping Duties in the Agricultural Sector : Trade Restricting or Trade 
Deflecting”, Global Eocnomy Journal, Vol 8(2) 
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where iμ ~ IID (0, σu
2) and ~IID (0, σv2)   independent of each other. itv iμ  denotes the 
individual specific residual, differing across cases but constant for a given case. For example, a 
country with comparative advantage in wheat is likely to have large imports in subsequent years 
and hence have a large value of iμ  Time is also normalized so that t=0 denotes  the year the 
petition was filed ; hence t= -1 refers to the year prior to the year prior to the filing,  t= - 2 refers 
to the year prior to that, t= +1 refers to the year after the filing, t= +2 refers to the year second 
year after filing and so on.  Thus, the cross section is identified by the cases whereas the time 
series variation is driven by annual observation on import trade before and after the AD petition.   
The standard method for estimating equation (1) is given by the fixed- effects estimator 
since it eliminates iμ  but the estimator will be biased and inconsistent since  will be 
correlated with FE estimator residual by construction. A similar problem will be there in case 
of . The extent of inconsistency will vary from application to application but in general 




To resolve this problem, the first differences of equation (1) can be taken. A two step 
GMM estimator is suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which yields a consistent estimator 
provided that there is no second order serial correlation among the errors.  Therefore in order to 
take the consistent estimator of , and  1∂ 2∂ β  the first difference of equation one is taken. This 
eliminates the individual country specific effect  iμ  
                                                 














By construction      and    will be correlated with the transformed 
residual , so there is a need to estimate the equation (3)  by means of instrumental 
variables. Both   and lagged values of  are valid instruments. According to Arellano 
and Bond (1991), additional valid instruments can be obtained if one utilizes the orthogonality 
condition that exists between the lagged values of   and the disturbances .  For time 
periods t= 0,1,2,3 one can use additional lags of ; for instance, for the period t=0,  
can be used as an additional instrument. Additional lags can be added for each forward period.
1, −tiy 2, −tiy
)1,,( −− tivtiv
3, −tiy tix ,
tiy , tiv ,
tiy , 3, −tiy
36 
2.4 Modeling and Data Issue Related to Proposed Research 
2.4.1 Modeling Issues 
Models that have been used to examine the effects of antidumping investigations in the 
United States and other parts of the world were considered in the previous section.  While some 
of these models were used to evaluate the effect of antidumping investigations on total imports, 
other models considered only agricultural products. With few exceptions, the previously 
discussed models made no attempt to incorporate the “spread out” of antidumping duty (Ganguli, 
2005 being the primary exception) nor did they attempt to incorporate the effect of changing 
exchange rates on imports due to antidumping investigation (Carter and Gunning being the 
primary exception). In the context of agricultural sector it is worthwhile to note both the spread 
                                                 
36 See Baltagi, Baldi. H(1995). “ Econometric Analysis of  Panel Data”, Wiley Press for the discussion of panel data 
analysis and its application. 
 28
out37 effect as well as the effect of exchange rate on the agricultural import pattern.  Based on the 
review of the relevant studies in section 2.2, the following conceptual model is proposed in this 
study to evaluate the impact of antidumping investigations on agricultural products entering the 


















The variable ln(imports jit) represents the natural log of imports for case i at time t for country 
group j while the variable ln(imports jit-1) represents a one-period lag of imports prior to the year 
of initiation of the case and ln(imports jit-2): 2-period lag of imports prior to the year of initiation 
of the case.  The variable lnexchrateit represents the log value of the exchange rate between the 
importing country’s currency and US dollar. The variable final duty reflects the duty level 
estimated by the USDOC. Finally, the variable named is a discrete variable denoting if the 
country has been named in the petition while yeart is a trend variable introduced in an attempt to 
control for macro economic trends.  
 In this model, both “spread out” of duty over the years and the effects of exchange rates 
on AD actions are considered in order to more fully analyze the impacts associated with 
antidumping investigations. Results obtained from the above model will then be compared to 
three alternative specifications.  
1) Konnings et al. (2001) model which is discussed in Section 2.2.138 
                                                 
37 The “spread out” effect is alternately referred to as the staggered effect . The term lnFinalDutyi×tj  captures the 
“spread-out” or staggered effect on duty in the years following the initial antidumping investigation.( Ganguli 
(2005) has used this variable for his study of antidumping investigation in the Indian economy.)  
 
38 This model was actually developed to look into the effect of antidumping investigation in the European economy. 
In this study this model would be tested in the context of US agricultural cases to compare the results obtained in the 
actual model. 
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2) Prusa (1997) model, which is discussed in Section 2.2.239  
3) Malhotra et al. (2008) model which is discussed in Section 2.2.540 
2.4.2 Timeframe of Analysis and Data Considerations  
This study concentrates on the antidumping cases filed during the period 1994-2004 and 
is based on a subset of the cases reported in Table 1.1.41 To examine the effect of antidumping 
investigation time series data for the period of 1992 to 2007 has been constructed from data 
available on the USITC and USDA websites42.  The following steps were used to create the data 
set: (a) the monthly data at 10-digit disaggregated level for the antidumping cases mentioned in 
the Federal Reserve notice was downloaded from the USDA website;  (b) to obtain a meaningful 
idea of the overall product category and to obtain a  higher level of precision for the econometric 
results, relevant data were aggregated from a 10-digit to an 8-digit product code level;  (c) 
relevant data were aggregated from a monthly level to a yearly level to remain for the purpose of 
consistency with the models discussed in Section 2.2; (d) consideration is given to each product 
category for a range of six-years with two years preceding the year of initiation, the third year 
corresponding to the year of initiation of the case, and the subsequent two years following the 
year of initiation.  (e) all exporting countries are included in the analysis even if any given  
                                                 
39 The actual model used by Prusa(1997) considered the effect of antidumping on overall US economy with 
agricultural as well as non agricultural products. However such analysis might ignore sector specific impacts which 
get abstracted at a broad level of aggregation.   To get a better insight for agricultural sector in specific I have looked 
into much more details of each product category. 
40 The same model is compared extending the time period of 1992-2007. The primary objective for such extension 
was to investigate for any possible trade diversion of agricultural products which are filed during the time period 
1994-2004 and provide a wider coverage of products. The cases which are terminated are excluded in this study. 
41 The cases which are filed in either 2005 or 2006 are not taken into account since, as discussed in a subsequent 
chapter, analysis requires two to three years of data post investigation. Similarly the cases filed prior 1994 are not 
considered since the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) classification changed in 1988.  In order to keep this study 
as accurate as possible the HTS classification of the recent version has been used.   
42 http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/ 
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country accounts for a small share of U.S. total imports for that product category.43 Overall 
imports and imports from named countries for each investigation are graphically illustrated in 
Appendix A (affirmative outcomes) and Appendix B (negative and terminated outcomes) . 
 The data for average duty is constructed from the Federal Register. In the Register for 
each product category, the actual weighted margin of antidumping duty for each firm for that 
product category is given. The value of those weighted margin is used to construct the average 
duty. For example antidumping duty has been imposed on each of the 10 firms who are 
exporting frozen fish fillet to United States. The total value AD duty of the exporting firms for 
that product is taken and then it has been divided by the number of firms to get the average duty 
for that product. To the extent that this simple average may not reflect the weighted average, 
results may be misleading.  Since the quantities exported by each company are not provided in 
the Federal Register, however, an average weighted duty by product and country cannot be 
constructed. 
 
                                                 
43 The investigations reports and results are obtained from the USITC website. In addition to this, Federal Register 
Notice has been studied extensively to obtain the code of the products which are named in the petition. The import 
injury investigation case statistics (1980-2005) published by United States International Trade Commission has been 
used for the cases.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section contains the analysis of the results of the effect of antidumping investigation 
on trade diversion. The agricultural antidumping investigations filed during the period 1994-
2004 are taken into consideration. The models discussed in the previous chapters are tested on 
the data set of agricultural imports for the period 1992-2007 




















In this equation, the dependent variable (ln imports jit) represents the natural log of imports for 
case i( i=1….,38) at time t for country group j (named, non-named).  The variable   ln imports jit0-
1 is used to control for initial import size effects and the evolution of imports prior to the 
antidumping investigation. Other explanatory variables including Dutyit, Negative44, Termiit 
(termination) and Namedit   are included in this equation to see the effect of these variables on 
imports. The variable dutyit is equal to 1 if there is a duty for the case i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, the variable Negativeit is discrete in nature which takes on a value of 1 if there is a 
negative decision for case i at time t.  Similarly, the variable termiit (termination) is discrete in 
nature which takes a value equal to 1 when there is termination for case i at time t. The dummy 
variable namedt is equal to 1 if the country is named in the petition for case i. The variable 
defined as Numbert represents the number of named countries in an antidumping case.  As 
argued by Prusa (1997), trade diversion effects should decline as the number of countries named 
in the petition increases. Following the model suggested by Konnings et al. (2001), interactions 
                                                 
44 This model has replaced the undertaking variable given in by Konnings et al. (2001) with the negative variable.  
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of the discrete variables with the policy variable (Named) are included in the analysis to capture 
the effect of AD actions on named countries.45  
The estimates associated with the European model (i.e, Konnings et al.) are provided in 
Table 3.1. OLS estimates are reported in the first column whereas the robust estimates are given 
in the next column. The robust estimates are used to correct for heteroscedasticity in the data 
(i.e., within group observations over time are not independent while the observations across 
groups are)                                  
Table 3.1: Effects of Antidumping actions on imports by Named and Non-named Countries. 
 (1)  OLS (2) Robust 












































Year Dummies Yes yes 
R-Sqaure 0.86 0.86 
Number of Observations 1830 1830 
 
                                                 
45 Year dummies are also included but  not reported to control for aggregate macroeconomic shocks 
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The effects of imports or trade diversion can be analyzed by comparing the effects of 
duties, negative decision, and termination with the same variables interacted with the discrete 
variable Namedi.  To illustrate the interpretation of the above equation, the effect of duties on the 
import values of the non-named countries is measured by the coefficient of α2 and on the named 
countries is measured by the sum of α2 and α5.46  Based on the information presented in Table 
3.1, the imposition of duties was found to result in a decline in imports from named countries of 
about 18% (i.e., α2 + α5 = -0.18) while imports from non-named countries were found to increase 
by 41% (i.e., α2 =0.419)47.  For terminated cases, imports from non-named countries were found 
to increase by 39% while imports among named countries were found to decline by 19% (i.e., α4 
+ α7 = -0.19).  For negative cases, finally, imports from non-named countries were found to 
increase by 30 % (i.e., α3 =.303) while imports from the named countries were found to increase 
by 13% (i.e., α3 + α5 = 0.13) 
In addition to the overall import model, separate analyses were conducted for the named 
countries and non-named countries (Table 3.2).48 As indicated, the analysis specific to named 
countries suggests that imposition of duties result in an import reduction among named countries 
equal to 13% which is only marginally different from the 18% that was estimated for the overall 
import model (i.e., Table 3.1).  Cases that are terminated were found to result in an import 
reduction among named countries equal to 16% which is similar to that found with the overall 
import model (19%).  Imports among named countries were found to increase by almost 10% in 
                                                 
46 Konnings, et al. (2001), “Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 
1(3): 283-299 
 
47 This value is calculated based on what Konnings et al.(2001) have mentioned in their model. 
48 As noted by Konnings et al. (2001), estimation of the overall import equation imposes a restriction that the initial 
import levels among named and non-named countries are the same.  Given that this restriction is likely not valid, the 
authors argue for analysis of split samples (i.e., named versus non-named countries).  Such a split sample analysis is 
conducted in most instances in this study. 
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cases with a negative finding. Terminated cases were found to result in about a 40% increase in 
imports among non-named countries.  
Table 3.2: Effects of Antidumping Actions on Imports (Named vs Non-named) 
 (1)             Named (2)                Non-named 











































Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Square .093 .093 0.83 0.83 
Number of 
Observations 
149 149 1681 1681 
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3.2 Prusa Model  



















The variable Dutyi denotes the size of the final duty.  The variable Numnamedi denotes a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when two or more countries are named in the petition.49 The variable Deci is a 
discrete variable taking on a value of 1 if duties are imposed. Calendar year dummies, denoted as 
yeart j, are introduced into the model in an attempt to capture macroeconomic effects arising in 
that year (and not specifically modeled in the equation) which might influence level of imports. 
Finally, the variable tj represents a trend variable ranging from -3 to +3 with the value of 0 
representing the year in which the case was filed.   
Estimates associated with overall imports are presented in Table 3.6.  Variables t1-t3 in 
the table refers to the post-investigation years. With canned mushrooms, for example, the case 
was initiated in 1997 with a decision rendered in 1998. The variables t1 through t3 denote the 
years from 1998 through 2000. Two separate set of regression50 estimates associated with 
equation 3.3 are calculated for overall imports.  The first regression corresponds with the actual 
unweighted duties associated with each product.  Rather than using the actual duty levels, the 
second regression uses two dummy variables to isolate the effects of duties on imports (the first 
dummy variable includes those products for which low duties are imposed while the second 
                                                 
49 A modification from the original model is used in this study. Specifically, whereas Prusa (1997) used three or 
more countries to define Numnamed, this study uses two or more countries. 
50 OLS estimates with robust standard error are used in this model. It alleviates the problem of heteroskedasticity 
associated with the estimates. 
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dummy variable includes those products for which high duties are imposed).51   These two 
dummy variables are constructed relative to moderate level of duties. In this model, moderate 
duties are used as the reference (for purposes of analysis, the values of duties in excess of 10% 
are considered as high duties while those duties less than 9 % are considered as low duties).52  
The results in Table 3.3 suggest that there was no initial effect on overall imports from 
the imposition of antidumping duties (i.e., there is no decrease in imports during the one-year 
investigation phase, even though duties are collected during this phase). The estimated duty 
effect was not only insignificant but positive; suggesting a negligible amount of increased 
imports (approximately 3%). 53 Overall, imports increased (after the first and second year 
following the decision) for cases where no duties were imposed54. However, overall imports for 
the product categories that resulted in affirmative decisions were found to decline in the year 
following the initiation of antidumping investigation cases. Specifically, a decline in imports of 
about 24% to 26% (depending upon whether actual unweighted duties are used in the analysis or 
whether high and low dummy duties are included) was found55.  But in the consecutive years, no 
such decline was found.  
Apart from analyzing the overall imports, named and non-named countries were 
considered separately. The effect of duties on named countries imports is presented in Table 
                                                 
51 These two dummy variables are constructed relative to moderate level of duties.  In this model, the reference level 
for  moderate duties  
52 Even if a case is rejected a duty level is estimated by the USDOC. Until the final injury determination, duties are 
collected as a bond pending the final outcome of the decision (Prusa (1997). We do not have cases  within the duty 
range 9% to 10%. 
53 3% =(0.027=.0211+.006) 
54 The time trend variables are positive in those years. The estimates of these variables help to determine the effect 
on overall imports if cases are not affirmative. The corresponding regression results are mentioned in the second 
column. 
55 The values are calculated as  [exp(-.28)-1]=.24 and [exp(-.31)-1]=.26 
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3.456. The estimated initial duty effect was found to be negative and statistically significant and 
indicated a decline in imports of about 5% (-0.05=.01701-.06840)57 among named countries (i.e., 
there is decrease in imports during the one-year investigation phase when estimated duties are 
collected but would be returned if a negative finding was forthcoming). Results from the dummy 
variable specification indicated that high duties had a somewhat higher impact (11% based on 
the parameter estimate of high duty, affirmative) on imports from the named countries than did 
low duties (10% based on low duty, affirmative). Though the results were not statistically 
significant, there was an estimated decline in imports of about 35% in the year following an 
affirmative decision (the time -decision cross- effect helps to determine this)58. By the second 
year following an affirmative decision, imports from named countries were estimated to be only 
6% below pre-decision imports, ceteris paribus. 
               The results for non-named countries are given in Table 3.5.  These results can be used 
to characterize the extent of trade diversion. The results, though not statistically significant, show 
that there was an estimated increase in imports from the non-named countries equal to 
approximately 4% (0.0379=.0242+.0137) during the investigation phase of the proceedings. 
From the results it can be concluded that low duty dummies had a significant effect on the values  
of imports from the non-named countries during the investigation phase.59 There was also a 
decline in imports by 26% in the year after the final affirmative decision is made.60                                 
                                                 
56 The results from Table 3.7 shows that antidumping duty has no significant effect on overall imports but the 
number of countries named in the petition is highly significant in determining the value of imports. The duty 
dummies though significant has negative impact on import. The time effect dummies are all positive except the third 
year dummy following the investigation. However overall import fall in the first year following the decision for 
cases where duties are imposed. 
 
57 This calculation is based on as given in Prusa(1997) 
58 The values are calculated as  [exp(-.12)-1]=.11 , [exp(-.11)-1]=.10 and [exp(-.44)-1]=.35 
59 In this analysis average duty for both the named countries and non-named countries is imposed to see what would 
be the effect on import if  duty is imposed on the non-named countries import 
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             Table 3.3: OLS estimates for Overall imports 
Variable                       Overall Imports  
 Actual Duty(1) Duty Dummy(2) 












Number>=2 ( dummy) (β2) .13777*** 
(.0609) 
.14083*** 
  (.0664) 
Size of Duty (β3) 
Log  Duty .02110 
(.0320) 
 
Low Duty(dummy)  -.19606 
(.2150) 
High Duty(dummy)  -.09117 
(.1900) 
Cross Effect: (Duty* Decision)(β4) 
Log Duty ( affirmative) .00621 
(.0320) 
 
Low duty ( affirmative)  .15676 
(.1782) 
High duty ( affirmative)  .05598 
(.1370) 














Cross Effect Years* decision (β6)  












R-Square 0.88 0.88 
Number of  Observations 1299 1304 
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% ***             
significant at 1 %( the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years 
                                                                                                                                                             
60 Interestingly, one can also conclude from the result that the variable number has statistically significant effect on 
overall imports and the imports from the non-named countries. The result is significant at 5 percent level. 
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Table 3.4: OLS estimates for Named Countries 
Variable                        Named Imports 
 Actual Duty(1) Duty Dummy(2) 
















Size of Duty (β3) 
Log  Duty .01701 
(.0484) 
 
Low Duty(dummy)  .45514* 
(.2493) 
High Duty(dummy)  .32099 
(.2441) 
Cross Effect: (Duty* Decision) (β4) 
Log Duty ( affirmative) -.068400* 
(.0416) 
 
Low duty ( affirmative)  -.11100 
(.1703) 
High duty ( affirmative)  -.12324 
(.1548) 













Cross Effect Years* decision (β6)  












R-Sqaure 0.92 0.92 
Number of  Observations 112 116 
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 
1%(the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years 
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Variable                       Non-named Imports 
 
 Actual Duty(1) Duty Dummy(2) 
















Size of Duty (β3) 





Low Duty(dummy)  -.50197** 
(.2720) 
High Duty(dummy)  -.22720 
(.2190) 
Cross Effect: (Duty* Decision) (β4) 
Log Duty ( affirmative) .01371 
(.0355) 
 
Low duty ( affirmative)  .31711 
 (.2277) 
High duty ( affirmative)  .06629 
(.1602) 













Cross Effect Years* decision (β6) 












R-Sqaure 0.85 0.85 
Number of  Observations 1187 1188 
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 
1%(the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years 
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3.3 Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam Model 












where jitimportsln  represents the natural log of imports for case i (i=1…………35)  at time t= (-
1,-2, 0 1, 2, 3) for country group j (named and non-named) . The variable  refers to 
the one-period lags of imports (in log form) prior to the initiation of the case. This variable is 
included in an attempt to control for the size effect of imports (i.e., that imports will vary by 
case) and for the evolution of imports prior to the antidumping investigation. The variable 
affirmativet takes the value of 1 for a case if the decision was affirmative (implying that duties 
were subsequently imposed). Similarly the variable negativet takes the value 1 if the decision 
was negative (implying that no duties were subsequently imposed). The interaction of affirmativet and 
negativet dummies with the year dummy is included in the analysis in an attempt to ‘capture’ the 
time trend of imports for affirmative and negative cases.
10
ln −itm
62  The variable tj  is a trend variable 
which takes a value of zero for years prior to when a decision is made, a value of one for the first 
year after the investigation, a value of two for the second year after the investigation, etc. This 
trend variable is included in an attempt to ‘capture’ import trends for the control group (which 
consists of the non-affirmative cases).   In estimating the above equation, finally, control for 
macroeconomic influences such as exchange rate changes and business cycles are taken into 
account by including calendar year dummies, denoted by the variable yeart.  
                                                 
61 Following the procedure outlined by Malhotra et al. (2008), terminated cases are not included in the analysis.  
Hence, the number of observations in this analysis are less than in the  
62 This is done for both the named and non-named countries. 
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The analysis conducted by Malhotra et al (2008) included separate regressions for named 
and non-named countries imports.  The current study extends this analysis by also analyzing 
overall imports.  In addition, the analyses conducted by Malhotra et al (2008) employed OLS and 
the Generalized Method of Moments model (GMM).  The first differencing of equation 3.2 
yields a first regressor which is correlated with the remaining time dependent part of the 
differenced residual. The GMM estimator is used to eliminate this problem. Here the Arellano 
Bond (AB) method is used as a GMM estimator. The Arellano Bond method estimates a 
dynamic panel by first differencing it in order to eliminate the individual error component and 
then estimating it by employing as instruments higher lags of the dependent and the independent 
variables as well as the differences of the regressors.63 
The OLS estimates presented in Table 3.6 suggest that overall imports decline in the first 
year subsequent to an affirmative decision but caution should be used in interpreting this variable 
since it is statistically insignificant. Based on the method given by Malhotra et al. (2008), the 
results for overall imports are calculated for the affirmative variable [exp (-.0238)-1= -0.023] and 
suggest a decrease in imports of approximately two percent. The results from the Arellano Bond 
GMM estimation method suggest negligible decline in imports the year following an affirmative 
decision ([exp (.0046)-1 = -0.0004]). Like the OLS model, the Arellano Bond indicated no 





                                                 
63 Malhotra, Rus and Kassam(2008), “ Antidumping  Duties in Agricultural Sector: Trade Restricting or Trade 
Deflecting?”, Global Economy Journal, Vol 8(2) 
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          Table 3.6: Antidumping action and Value of Overall Imports 
Dependent Variable :
Log Value of Imports 
OLS  Arellano Bond 















































No of Observations 1558 1103 
R-Square 0.87  
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
 *** significant at 1%(the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years, the four terminated cases are 
not taken into account: These are fresh tomato, honey, mussels, hazelnut ) AB method does not report R-square  
 
The results for the named and non-named countries are presented separately in Tables 3.7 
and 3.8, respectively. The coefficient for lagged import value is found to be positive and 
significant for all regression estimates suggesting a positive relationship between lagged and 
current imports, ceteris paribus. The results from the named country imports (Table 3.7) suggest 
a decline in imports in the first year after an affirmative decision is made. The OLS estimates 
found that in the year following an AD investigation, imports from the named countries for 
affirmative cases declined to 26%, ceteris paribus.   The Arellano Bond method suggests a 23% 
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decline in imports in first year following the AD64  While the statistical insignificance of the 
parameters used in making these estimates suggest some caution, the results tend to “mirror” 
those found in the analysis of the Konnings et al. (2001) model specification.   
The OLS results associated with equation 3.2 indicate negative decisions result in a 
negligible decline in imports in the first year following the decision.  This finding is in contrast 
to Prusa (2001) but, in general, is consistent with the results of Malhotra (2008)65.  Due to 
statistical insignificance associated with the relevant parameter estimates, it cannot be concluded 
that there is strong investigation/ harassment effect but there is an indication of harassment effect 
in case of the named countries.  
From the OLS results of the non-named countries (Table 3.8), one can note that there is a 
statistically significant increase in imports among non-named countries in the first year after a 
negative decision. The results associated with the Arellano Bond estimator also suggest a large 
increase, though the parameter estimate in this model is only marginally significant. The 
rationale for the large increase in imports among non-named countries in the first year after a 
negative decision is not apparent.  With respect to named countries (Table 3.7), the expected 
impacts on imports in the year following a negative determination vary considerably depending 
upon whether the OLS or Arellano Bond estimates are considered.  Specifically, while the OLS 
estimates suggest only minimal disruption by named countries (-2.0%) the Arellano Bond 
estimates indicate increased imports of about 50% in the year following a negative determination 




                                                 
64 The calculation is based on the value [exp(-.3059)-1]=-0.26 for OLS and [exp(-.2744)-1]= -0.23. 
65 Prusa(2001) has tried to measure investigation effect/ harassment effect. Malhotra  etc(2008) had tried to test that 
effect in their paper. Since this model is based on Malhotra etc (2008), I have replicated that here. 
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             Table3.7: Antidumping action and Value of Named Countries Imports 
Dependent Variable :
Log Value of Imports 
OLS  Arellano Bond 
















































No of Observations 129 100 
R-Square 0.92  
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 
1%(the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years, the four terminated cases are not taken into account: 
These are fresh tomato, honey, mussels, hazelnut ) AB method does not report R-square 
Fixed effect helps to capture the product level differences 
 
 46
      Table 3.8: Antidumping action and Value of Non-Named Countries Imports 
Dependent Variable :
Log Value of Imports 
OLS  Arellano Bond 

















































No of Observations 1429 1003 
R-Square 0.83  
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 
1%(the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years, the four terminated cases are not taken into account: 
These are fresh tomato, honey, mussels, hazelnut ) 




3.4 Expanded Model Based on Previous Studies 
As discussed in Section 2.4, an extension of the models proposed by previous researchers is 



















In this model, ln imports jit denoted the import of case i( i=1………..38) at tth  period for country 
group j ( named and non-named). The first variable ln imports jit-1 denotes the one period lag of 
imports and the variable ln imports jit-2 denotes the two period lagged imports. The interaction 
term ln (FinaDutyi ×tj) (final duty and time) denotes the spread out effect of antidumping duty 
where j=0, 1, 2, 366. The variable ln (exchrateitj) denotes the log vale of exchange rate between 
the United States and the importing countries. Since the period of observation for each case is six 
years, data for the post investigation period for each case is collected through the third year of 
post investigation.67. Two separate regression estimates including overall imports, imports from 
named countries and imports from non-named countries are considered. OLS estimates, and 
feasible generalized least square estimates (FGLS)68 are considered. FGLS allows estimation in 
the presence of AR (1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and 
heteroscedasticity across panels.69 The results for OLS estimates and FGLS are given in Table 
3.9, Table 3.10. The OLS estimates suggest that there is a significant amount (results are 
                                                 
66 This is explained in detail in chapter II. t0 is the period when investigation has been filed, t1 –t3 denotes the post 
investigation period. 
67 Note: This study has included the cases through 2004. Post investigation data for cases are available through2007.  
68 The feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method is used to estimate the variance structure when the co-
variance matrix is not known. The value of the coefficient does not change in OLS and FGLS. FGLS is more 
efficient than the OLS method. 
69 Baltagi, Baldi. H(1995). “ Econometric Analysis of  Panel Data”, Wiley Press for the discussion of panel data 
analysis and its application 
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significant at 5%) of spread out effect associated with AD actions on overall imports and named 
country imports at t1, the year following the investigation.  Among named countries  
 Table 3.9: OLS Estimate Result 
 Dependent Variable : 
Log Value of Imports 
Overall Imports(1) Named-Imports(2) Non-named 
Imports(3) 


















































No of observations 1296 112 1184 
R-Square 0.87 0.92 0.84 
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1 
%( the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years). This OLS model with robust option which takes care of 
the problem of heteroscedasticity within the model 
 
Imports were found to decline by 7% in the first year following the investigation.70 Among non-
named countries, imports were observed to increase by about 8%71 in the first year following the 
antidumping investigation. The FGLS estimates yield similar results. The results derived in this 
section suggest that there is significant amount of spread-out of antidumping duty among the 
non-named countries.  Though the imports from the named countries show a declining trend, the 
results are not statistically significant. Hence, trade diversion appears not to be significant. 
                                                 
70 Results for the named country imports are not statistically significant. 
71 The results are significant at 5%. 
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Table 3.10: Feasible Generalized Least Square Estimate Result 
 Dependent Variable : 
Log Value of Imports 
Overall Imports(1) Named-Imports(2) Non-named 
Imports(3) 


















































No of observations 1296 112 1184 
Note: Absolute value of standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 
1%( the years t1, t2 and t3 are the post investigation years. The FGLS is least square method which takes care of the 
both the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity within the panel and across the panel. There is no change 
in the coefficient but the standard errors changes in this model. 
 
The analysis also suggests that exchange rates do not have a statistically significant effect on 
imports from the named and non-named countries. This implies that exchange rate in this model 
is not an essential variable to determine the impact of antidumping actions on the level of import.  
     The models which were discussed in the previous sections take into account either the actual 
level of duty or else a duty dummy variable is constructed to assess the effect antidumping action 
on overall imports. In this context, it is interesting to note the results derived from the Prusa 
(1997) model.  The model, as noted, is specified in such a manner that the effect of antidumping 
actions both in the initial phase of investigation and after the investigation period is considered.  
It is observed from the OLS estimates that there is a decline of overall imports in the first period 
following the antidumping investigation. But the results for the named and non-named countries 
derived in the Malhotra et al (2008) model are in line with the results of the proposed study. Both 
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the model confirms to the fact that there is decline in named countries imports in the first year 
following the investigation.  As far as the non-named countries import is concerned we could see 
that there is an increase in the imports among the non-named countries in the years after the 
investigation. The increase in imports is significant in the proposed model.  
                       In the Konnings et al (2001) model we could see that the separate results derived 
from overall imports and named country imports confirm the fact that there is a decline in 
imports from the named countries if the cases are affirmative or terminated72. However negative 
decision outcomes after imposing duties show an increase in imports from the named countries. 
Terminated cases from non named countries show a larger increase in imports. The results 




                                                 
72 The terminates cases mostly result in some kind of negotiation between the exporting and importing countries and 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The debate of trade diversion has been explored from different perspectives. Several studies 
showed that trade diversion are indeed a reality while other studies have concluded otherwise. 
Such differences call for careful investigation and demands attention regarding the intricate 
issues involved in producing such difference. One such factor is the level of aggregation of 
products considered in these studies. Import data is available at a more disaggregated level than 
data available for antidumping duties levied. Any aggregation scheme downplays the actual 
impact on specific products. In order to get a more accurate picture of the impact antidumping 
duty concordance of the import data and data for duty needs to be done. Such effort captures the 
diversifying impact of duties on trade in more accurate terms. Another commonly appearing 
reason is the difference in econometric modeling being used to estimate the impact of duties.  
In this study different econometric models are used to compare the impact of AD 
investigation on cases filed against agricultural products during the period 1994-2004. The data 
range, based on 8 digit HTS classification, is for a span of six years for each of these product 
categories. The different econometric models considered in this study are compared for total 
imports, imports from named countries imports and imports from non-named countries. Analysis 
of these alternative models indicates that the imposition of antidumping duties has been 
successful in reducing the overall imports of targeted products (i.e., products from named 
countries in the various petitions).  The analysis also indicates that trade diversion from named 
countries to the non-named countries is not significant.  
The further scope of research which stems from this research is in the area of product 
diversion. Instead of looking separately into the HTS trade classification of the cases which are 
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filed, a future potential for research would be to look into each of these product categories 
separately and to investigate whether there is product diversion due to antidumping investigation 
within these product categories. While results of the current analysis suggests that there is a 
reduction in imports from named countries for products which are investigated, there is a 
possibility that those named countries are switching to different category of the same product and 
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Figure A.1: Imports of Salmon 
 
Figure A.1 depicts the total US imports of Atlantic salmon over a period of six year. The case 
was filed in 1997 against Chile (i.e., the named country). An antidumping duty was imposed on 
product from Chile in 1998. In Figure A.2, the named country imports of salmon for the period 
of study are depicted. 





















Figure A.2: Named Countries Imports of Salmon 
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Figure A.3: Imports of Crawfish Tailmeat 
 
 Figure A.3 depicts the total US imports of crawfish tail meat over a period of six year. 
The case was filed against China in 1996. An antidumping duty was subsequently imposed on 
China in 1997. In the Figure A.4, imports of crawfish tail meat from China (i.e., the named 
country) during the period of study is depicted. 
  
















































Figure A.5: Imports of Fresh Garlic 
 
Figure A.5 depicts the total US import of Fresh Garlic over a period of six year. The case has 
been filed in 1994 against China. An antidumping duty has been imposed on China in the year 
1995. In figure A.6 named countries imports of Fresh Garlic for the period of study is depicted. 
 
Figure A.6: Named Countries Imports of Fresh Garlic 








































Figure A.7: Imports of Canned Pineapple 
 
Figure A.7 depicts the total US import of Canned Pineapple over a period of six year. The case 
has been filed against Thailand in 1994. An antidumping duty has been imposed on Thailand in 
the year 1995. In figure A.8 the named countries imports of Canned Pineapple for the period of 
study is depicted. 











































Figure A.9: Imports of Mushroom 
Figure A.9 graph depicts the total US import of Certain Preserved Mushroom over a period of 
six year. The case has been filed in the year 1998 against Chile, China, India and Indonesia. An 
antidumping duty has been imposed on these countries in 1998. In figure A.10 the named 












































Figure A.11: Imports of Raspberry 
 
Figure A.11 depicts the total US import of Raspberry over a period of six year. The case has 
been filed in 2001 against Chile. An antidumping duty has been imposed on Chile in the year 
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Figure A.13: Imports of Honey 
 
Figure A.13 depicts the total US import of Honey over a period of six year. The case has been 
filed in 2000 against China and Argentina. An antidumping duty is imposed on these countries in 
2001. In figure A.14 the named countries imports of Honey for the period of study is depicted 
             










































Figure A.15: Imports of Durum Wheat 
 
Figure A.15 depicts the total US import of Durum Wheat over a period of six year. The case is 
filed in 2002 against Canada. An antidumping duty is imposed on these countries in the year 
2003. In figure A.16 the named countries import of Durum Wheat for the period of study is 
depicted 
 









































Figure A.17: Imports of Shrimp 
 
Figure A.17 depicts the total US import of Shrimp over a period of six year. The case has been 
filed in the year 2004 against Brazil, China, India, Ecuador, Thailand and Vietnam. An 
antidumping duty has been imposed on these countries in the year 2005. In Figure A.18 the 
















































Figure A.19: Imports of Softwood Lumber 
 
Figure A.19 depicts the total US import of Softwood Lumber over a period of six year. The case 
is filed against Canada in 2001. An antidumping duty has been imposed on these countries in the 
year 2002. In figure A.20 the named countries imports of Softwood Lumber for the period of 
study is depicted. 
 
 











































Figure A.21: Imports of Frozen Fish Fillet 
 
Figure A.21  depicts the total US import of Frozen Fish Fillet over a period of six year. The case 
is  filed in 2002 against Vietnam. An antidumping duty is imposed on Vietnam in 2003. In figure  
A.22 the named countries imports of Frozen Fish Fillet for the period of study is depicted. 
 







































Figure A.22: Named Countries Imports of Frozen Fish Fillet 
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APPENDIX B: TOTAL IMPORTS AND NAMED COUNTRIES’ IMPORTS 
FOR NEGATIVE OUTCOMES 
 
The Graphs given below are for the antidumping cases which have either negative outcome or 
else terminated 
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Imports of Live Cattle
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Figure B.8: Named Countries Imports of Live Cattle 
 
 















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year




















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
 70
















1999 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
 














































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
 
Figure B.11: Imports of Mussels 
 
   
 
























Figure B.12: Named Countries Imports of Mussels 
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Figure B.17: Imports of Green Tomato 
 
 
          





































Figure B.18: Named Countries Imports of Green Tomato 
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Figure B.19: Imports of Live Swine 
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